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Goodbye,
Mr Law
The June massacre highlighted the shallowness of legality 
in the 'new China' of the 1980s. It also highlighted the 
tragic naivety of the reform movement. Michael Dutton 
and Steve Reglar argue that the obstacles to reform are 
now greater than ever.
rn D ecem ber 1988 two o f  China’s leading dissident in­tellectuals, Yan Jiaqi and Wen Yuankai, were invited by the 
magazine Economics Weekly to 
express their views about the fu­
ture prospects of the reform  
process in China. Both were ex­
traordinarily pessimistic. China’s 
reform process, they suggested, 
had sunk into a ‘quagmire’ and 
the future of reform was, as a 
result, not bright. China lacked 
the necessary constitu tional 
guarantees which would ensure 
basic citizen rights.
Certainly there was a constitution and, 
within this, a series of legal guarantees 
were offered. The problem was that 
these guarantees were expressed in such 
abstract terms as to render them next to 
useless. Worse still, the abstract nature 
of the constitution meant that its clauses 
were easily manipulated for political 
purposes and thus the guarantees them­
selves could become a cover for a series 
of actions which could, ultimately lead 
to the deprivation of rights. Hence, 
despite the fact that the reform regime 
of Deng Xiaoping had done much to put 
‘rule by law’ on the reform agenda, 
much still needed to be done so as to 
ensure that law could be made effective. 
No longer were the legendary demands 
of the May 4 Movement in China 
enough.
The demands of the student radicals in 
the 1919 May 4 movement for a regime 
which would organise around the twin 
poles of ‘Mr Science’ and ‘Mr 
Democracy’ was inadequate in the 
1980s, they suggested. Wen Yuankai in 
particular went on to suggest that a new 
‘gentleman’ was now needed to supple­
ment the other two. This ‘gentleman’, 
he said, was the much neglected ‘Mr 
Law’. Wen claimed that, without the 
presence of ‘Mr Law’, reformists could 
easily become the victims of ‘illogical 
political actions’ carried out by the 
authorities. Such actions, he suggested, 
could even result in the government 
"wielding the big stick” against refor­
mist elements and entail the "wholesale 
and illogical criticisms" of such ele­
ments by the government. The mas­
sacres and lies which have followed the 
savage repression of the Tiananmen 
demonstrators vindicate Wen’s pes­
simism.
Indeed, this article itself became the 
subject of "wholesale and unwarranted 
criticism" when the mayor of Beijing, 
Chen Xitong, picked it out for special 
criticism in his address on the subject of 
the June massacre to the National 
People’s Congress on 30 June 1989. 
Chen suggested that the publication of 
this interview with Wen Yuankai and 
Yan Jiaqi was designed to "whip up 
public opinion" so that the program of 
bourgeois liberalisation could be 
pushed forward "with even less
restraint". Moreover, Chen suggested, 
this ‘attack’ upon socialism by Wen and 
Yan was done in collaboration with ‘ex­
ternal forces’ who were implacably 
hostile to Chinese socialism. Yan and 
Wen’s discussion, far from being fair 
comment on the weaknesses of the 
reform program, was treated as reac­
tionary criticism designed to undermine 
the socialist reform program itself.
Yet it is quite clear that discussions of 
the need to extend legal and constitu­
tional rights and guarantees was not 
solely the preserve of supposed 
‘reactionaries’ and ‘dissidents’ such as 
Wen and Yan. Indeed, the very leader­
ship which so brutally suppressed the 
student movement in June this year had 
itself, in the late ’seventies, championed 
the issue of legally constituted rights. I& 
was indeed one of the central tenets of 
the post-‘Gang of Four’ leadership in 
China that rule by law was needed to 
overcome the ‘lawlessness’ of the cul­
tural revolution.
From the mid-seventies onwards, the; 
party and state embarked on a massive 
program to reinstitute the rule of law 
and its legitimacy. The legal profession 
was revitalised, codification and 
ratification of substantial bodies of 
legislation in all fields was undertaken 
and a very real and serious attempt w&> 
made to spread and popularise legal 
knowledge. The early ’eighties also saw 
the beginnings of a whole series of in­
stitu tional reform s which were
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designed to democratise the govern­
ment. The local elections of 1980, the 
relaxation of political constraints within 
intellectual circles and the attempts to 
implement some of the market socialist 
ideas of Hungarian and Yugoslav 
socialism all pointed to a limited and 
cautious expansion of rights at this time.
From the early days of reform discus­
sions in 1978 to the demonstrations in 
Tiananmen Square, there has been a 
recognition that the fate of all reforms 
rests in finding a way of separating the 
work of party, state and the economy. 
Reformist political economists argued 
that control of the economy should be 
vested in economic managers, who 
would make decisions according to 
their understanding of how ‘objective 
economic laws’ operate. Political 
decisions would no longer override im­
portant economic considerations such 
as the level of pricing, investment and 
accumulation targets. And increased 
enterprise autonomy would allow 
managers to make rational decisions 
concerning production levels and future 
developments.
This world of decentralised economic 
management however, would not be 
anarchic. The Chinese leaders may 
> have feted Milton Friedman in Beijing, 
but they were not converts to laissez- 
faire capitalism. Reforms would be sub­
ject to what Deng Xiaoping termed the 
‘Four Cardinal Principles’: "the 
socialist road, Mao Zedong thought 
(even though it was stated that the late 
‘Chairman’ had personally deviated 
fronr the essence of his thought in his 
later years), People’s Democratic Dic­
tatorship, and the primacy of the Party". 
The problem was how to reform within 
these stipulations.
The answer rested in invoking 
economic laws backed up by constitu­
tional law. Legally enforceable con­
tracts, income taxation instead of profit 
resumption by the state and banking 
loans made on commercial criteria 
would provide the integrative 
mechanisms necessary.
Law and constitutionally defined 
rights were considered functionally 
necessary for the introduction of sound 
economic management gs they would 
clearly establish the responsibilities of 
all parties concerned, and thereby 
prevent chaos. Law, in setting the rules 
of the game, would also define and 
delimit the boundaries of state and party 
in economic and political life.
Henceforth, the party and its officials 
would be subject to law. A clear 
division of labour would be instituted 
where the party would concern itself 
with the long-term goals of mapping a 
path from "underdeveloped socialism" 
to "developed socialism" and eventual­
ly to "communism". The party could 
also carry out campaigns designed to 
encourage a "socialist" consciousness 
in the masses. The campaign to promote 
a "socialist spiritual civilisation" con­
formed with this rubric.
Accordingly, the state would gain a 
degree of autonomy in determining im­
mediate policies and representing the 
people. The state would formulate the 
laws which would control the economy 
and give enhanced rights to the people. 
The problem was that, given the nature 
of leninist organisation, the party had to 
have policy superiority over the state 
and the economy in the final instance. 
Predictably, this ‘last instance’ unlike
an Althusserian "last instance", did 
eventuate on many occasions.
The citizen and property rights 
guaranteed in this process of reform 
were far from being ‘empty shells’, but 
neither were they open-ended. From the 
very start of the reform process, how­
ever, it was clear that there were 
predetermined limits to these rights. 
When the criminal law could not ac­
commodate the party ’ s immediate goals 
there was little hesitation in resorting to 
extra-legal means. The trial of the so- 
called ‘Gang of Four’ was a case in 
point It was little other than a show trial 
with little weight being given to defence 
pleas. The same can be said of most of 
the trials of the democracy wall dissi­
dents of the late ’seventies and, in par­
ticular, the notorious trial of Wei 
Jingshen. This tendency to utilise extra- 
legal means when thought necessary 
was, however, not solely confined to the 
policing of political dissent.
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In late 1983 a series of police sweeps 
was instituted as part of a general crack­
down on street crime in China. To 
facilitate such police action, key sec­
tions of the C onstitution were 
suspended. Emergency measures were 
invoked, increasing dramatically the 
type of sentences which could be meted 
out for those crimes targetted in this 
campaign. In addition, the procedures 
for dealing with these elements were 
‘speeded up’. Summonses were no 
longer necessary and details of the char­
ges were no longer forwarded to the 
defendant’s counsel. The right of appeal 
was severely limited. Arbitrary arrest 
and, in some cases, execution of 
criminal gangs and so-called ‘hoodlum 
elements’ followed. Reportedly, quotas 
were set for the arrest and execution of 
corrupt and criminal elements. It has 
been estimated that some 100,000 
people were arrested in these nation­
wide sweeps. Legally defined rights 
were denied to the accused criminal and 
the convicted criminal in this campaign.
All this was fine as far as the general 
public was concerned, so long as the
erosion of rights was confined to mar­
ginal, criminal and generally un­
desirable elements in society. The 
problem is, however, that the erosion of 
rights which was actively supported by 
the general public when instituted 
against hoodlums in 1983 and against 
prisoners generally has now been 
turned against significant sections of 
the population at large.
Perhaps the best way of understanding 
the structural mechanisms which impel 
continued incursions of human and 
legal rights stems from the dissident 
party theoretician Su Shaozhi.
For Su, neo-authoritarianism arises 
from feudal remnants. Feudal remnants 
are a continually reproducing feature of 
contemporary Chinese society. Nor are 
corruption and official malevolence, as 
some party bureaucrats would have it, a 
result of the reforms or of the ‘open 
door’ and western decadence. While, 
arguably, western influence has its 
decadent effects, the primary cause lies 
in the continuing fusion of political and 
economic structures.
The fusion of state, party and 
economy creates a situation where all 
goals become subservient to the politi­
cal. In a situation where the party main­
tains ‘iron’ laws of discipline, normal 
and non-threatening dissent becomes il­
legitimate. In fact, neo-authoritarianism 
becomes a continuing temptation. This 
becomes especially prevalent when the 
party is unable to lay down ground rules 
for freedom of expression. Part of this 
difficulty  arises from ‘orthodox 
marxism’ subsuming politics to con­
siderations of class. Many questions 
arise which are not amenable to a class 
reductionist framework. Political prac­
tice should recognise these and allow a 
degree of political pluralism where in­
terest groups can express their con­
cerns.
Su Shaozhi and other dissidents such 
as Wang Ruoshui have little advice as 
to how legitimate criticism can be dis­
tinguished from illegitimate. This, we 
might add, is not a simple problem and 
it does not only affect ‘socialist’ 
regimes. The boundaries of legitimate 
dissent are equally as obscure in
f
Two Myths of the 
Beijing Massacre
Some on the left seem beholden 
to two myths connected with the 
Beijing massacre in June.
The first is that the students’ sole 
genuine demand was the elimination 
of corruption and, therefore, that the 
call for democracy was merely a 
genuflection to their naive view of the 
west.
Indeed, the argument goes, the fact 
that the students sang The Internation­
ale, praised Gorbachev and did not 
call for the overthrow of the Chinese 
Communist Party showed they were 
not interested in widening Chinese 
democracy or human rights.
Wrong. While students, like workers 
and intellectuals, strongly opposed 
corrupt practices, such as the opera­
tion of foreign bank accounts by 
senior leaders, they also perceived the 
direct link between democracy and 
corruption.
The rigid, hierarchical structure of 
Chinese society encourages almost 
feudal-like networks of patronage, all 
leading towards the centre. The 
Chinese party-state  has been 
described by one writer as "a stratified 
system of corruption". Critically, 
there is no democratic check on 
bureaucrats, senior party leaders or the 
party itself.
Our own parallel, albeit on a milder 
scale, is Queensland, where Commis­
sioner Tony Fitzgerald QC has em­
phasised the link between the state’s 
undemocratic electoral system and the 
entrenched networks of corruption.
The other, less believable, line ped­
dled by some socialists is that some­
how foreign capital was involved in 
the massacre, or that it would be a 
beneficiary. In this way, some seem to 
think, foreign business is implicated in 
the massacre and the crackdown.
Despite the iniquities, waste and un­
trammelled economic power usually 
associated with multinationals, the 
above argument misses the point, or 
several points.
Foreign businesses - not to mention 
foreign embassies - were fired upon by 
troops in the weeks following the mas­
sacre. Even the China International 
Trade and Investment Corp (CITIC) 
building, the skyscraper citadel of 
modem Chinese business and head of­
fice to many western companies, was 
strafed with gunfire. Over this and 
other similar incidents, no apologies 
have been issued.
Meanwhile, not only have many 
foreign businesses withdrawn, but the 
goodwill which led many of them to 
China in the first place has evaporated.
Holding the reins of power now in 
China are those such as Chen Yun, 
xenophobic old men who despise vir­
tually all of the economic and social 
advances of 1987-89, including any 
involvement with foreign capital. As 
we now see, they are doing their best 
to turn the clock back.
Robert Clark. 
_____________________________j
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‘western democracies’ as workers’ 
movements and civil rights activists 
have long known to their cost How­
ever, legitimate dissent in leninist 
regimes does represent a very special 
set of problems.
The failure of Chinese reformers to set 
out clear criteria for dissent is com­
pounded by their failure to set out ex­
actly  what the rule of law and 
democracy might mean in practice. 
There was also, with only a few excep­
tions, a failure to link political and legal 
reforms to the actual practice of 
economic reform, or to consider what 
material basis there might be to under­
pin political and legal practice. Com­
pounding these inadequacies has been 
the practice of dissident intellectuals of 
continuing the traditional Chinese 
intellectuals’ long-practised disdain for 
workers and peasants.
The result is that intellectual dissent is 
relatively easily dismissed. Workers 
and peasants need political and 
economic programs which will work, 
and their interests have to be considered 
and addressed. The high-sounding 
phrases of intellectuals calling for 
democracy and law will fall on deaf ears 
if such interests are not dealt with.
The result was that, while a large num­
ber of workers were sympathetic and 
some were active in challenging the an- 
cien regime, there were contradictions 
of considerable proportions evident: 
contradictions such as real wage decline 
for workers and spiralling production 
costs to peasants which would only 
have been exacerbated if further 
economic liberalisations, advocated by 
intellectuals, were implemented. 
Hence, an alliance between intellec­
tuals, workers and peasants was always 
a limited, fragmentary one.
Considering the writings of intellec­
tuals on law, and democracy as a whole, 
one is struck by the naivety which per­
vades much of i t  This is not simply the 
naivety of students who reportedly ad­
mired the democratic nature of South 
Korea, Taiwan and the USA or of Fang 
Lizhi’s views on western democracy 
and social theory. There is a child-like 
faith in constitutional law as the basis of 
freedom and willingness to consider 
only grand theoretical issues which in 
the main makes much of the writing 
untranslatable into action. Debates as to 
the class nature of law and the nature of 
humankind are important. But they can
signify that debate is being diverted into 
non-threatening forms.
It is peculiar that intelligent scholars 
who are well versed in Soviet history 
can still place their faith in constitution­
al legal provisions. Stalin was correct 
when he declared that the Soviet Con­
stitu tion of 1936 was the most 
democratic in the contemporary world! 
As we all know, however, this constitu­
tion was not worth the paper it was 
written on. Flagrant and monstrous 
violations of human rights even claimed 
the reputed author of the constitution, 
Nicolai Bukharin.
Constitutional law and democracy re­
quire a social basis. The conviction that 
human beings should be treated as 
bearers of rights and possessors of 
legitimate interests needs to be sus­
tained by an ongoing practice. The in­
troduction of constitutional law in an 
essentially  feudal po litica l and 
economic system where state and 
economy are effectively fused and party 
officials have privileges conferred by 
their position is bound for failure.
Constitutionalism requires that each 
person is a separate autonomous subject 
who possesses inalienable rights. It 
states that such rights can only be sur­
rendered after due process and it re­
quires an economic practice which 
supports the treatment of others as sub­
jects in their own right. Institutional 
arrangements must reflect this principle 
of autonomy. The dominance of the 
political over other fields of practice 
and other institutions tends to negate the 
ability of constitutional law to protect 
individuals. The rule of politics over 
economics and iron discipline over 
politics subverts the proper relationship 
of polity and state.
Su’s analysis is perhaps explained 
more fully if we examine the ways in 
which an essentially feudal economic 
management can maintain an intran­
sigent hierarchy. The po litical 
economist He Jianzhang stressed that 
the economic structure of China was 
inherently hierarchical. It was akin to an 
ancient system of patriarchy where 
production took place in semi-autarchic 
family units. Exchange of goods and the 
creation of an extensive division of 
labour threaten such a system and 
threaten the patriarch’s power.
He claimed that concentrating on the 
question of centralisation versus 
decentralisation in the economy, or plan 
and market, is really misunderstanding
the nature of the problem. The problem 
of reform in the economy was to break 
up a system of hierarchies which linked 
centre, region, locality and enterprise 
into a chain of command with lateral 
co-ordination only attempted at the 
highest echelons. Reform was 
frustrated because there was a consider­
able community of vested interests in 
each chain. H ence, worker and 
bureaucrat alike would strive to main­
tain their common interests in the 
preservation of the status quo. For He, 
the main problem was economic 
reform. It meant separating state, party 
and economic management and creat­
ing a system of commodity exchange 
which would break up the vertical 
chains of vested interest by creating in­
termediary links through lateral ex­
changes of things, in part by extending 
the division of labour and by increasing 
enterprise autonomy.
The argument needs to go further than 
He Jianzhing takes it. Marx stated that, 
short of a fully developed communist 
society where real costs would be 
eliminated, if we took away the social 
power of things (commodities) we had 
to give it to individuals to exercise over 
others. Political power over the 
economy, if it took patriarchal forms, 
would be the enemy of freedom. While 
freedoms enshrined in bourgeois con­
stitutions were limited, they were none­
theless a significant advance over 
feudal privilege, and they were an es­
sential precondition for broader 
freedoms.
This point is critical for China. Con­
stitutional law requires the introduction 
of an economic system and a political 
system which guarantees individual 
freedoms and allows the creation of 
reforms in state, party and economy. 
Resorting to persecution or to prior 
forms of organisation is essentially 
futile. In the long term, the reactionaries 
who ordered the repression of the 
Tiananmen protests will be recognised 
for what they are. The reform program 
must continue and must deal with politi­
cal and legal reform. These are now 
more urgent than ever.
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ERRATA: In ALR 111, the Briefing on the 
Ju n e  4 m assacre  m en tio n s 'ten s  o f  
thousands' o f  dead and injured. This should 
have read 'thousands'. 4
